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Fear of Crime and Punishment 
Annalise Acorn, University of Alberta
It was a back staircase, dark and narrow, but he was familiar
with it already, and knew his way, and he liked all these surroundings:
in such darkness even the most inquisitive eyes were not to be dreaded.
‘If I am so scared now, what would it be if it somehow came to pass that I were really 
going to do it?’
1
***
Sonia had long been accustomed to the
room's being uninhabited. But all that time Mr. Svidrigaïlov had been
standing, listening at the door of the empty room. When Raskolnikov went
out he stood still, thought a moment, went on tiptoe to his own room
which adjoined the empty one, brought a chair and noiselessly carried it
to the door that led to Sonia's room. The conversation had struck him
as interesting and remarkable, and he had greatly enjoyed it--so much so
that he brought a chair that he might not in the future, to-morrow, for
instance, have to endure the inconvenience of standing a whole hour, but
might listen in comfort.
2
Fyodor Dostoyevsky 
Crime and Punishment 
Is fear the cornerstone of the law? If we think of the law as a list of prohibitions or 
injunctions enforced by punishments it is easy to conclude that it is. Could there be such 
a thing as law without punishment? Is the notion of punishment intelligible without 
understanding it as something to be feared?  Is the threat of punishment ever made 
without the desire that it will instill fear – a fear sufficiently potent to act as a motivation 
to obedience? The authoritative “Do X, or else,” (or more usually “Don’t you dare do X, 
or else.”) marks the basic structure of law, or at least of the criminal law. And it is a 
structure that presumes the intention and ability to instill fear.
                                                
1 Dostoyevsky, Crime and Punishment, translated by Constance Garnett, Part I, Chapter I. Online at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2554/2554-8.txt. 
2 Ibid. at Part IV. Chapter IV. 
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One of the most famous legal theorists of all time, John Austin, championed a 
theory which strongly suggested that fear was central to the notion of law itself. He held 
that laws are the commands of sovereigns backed by threats of evil.
3 The “evil” necessary 
for a legal sanction was – for Austin – at bottom simply something to be feared. Though 
fear was central to Austin’s notion of a command, “violence” was not. Threats of 
violence were a subset of the sort of “evil” a sovereign could use to coerce obedience. 
Fear not violence was the necessary ingredient.
Austin’s theory was roundly criticized on many fronts. But what many found 
objectionable about it was precisely his focus on coercion and its associations with fear. 
If laws are nothing but coercive commands how are they different from the demands of a 
gunman who says “your money or your life”?
4 If fear is the cornerstone of law, what 
distinguishes the lawmaker from the bully? If fear is what motivates people to obey, how 
can the law claim legitimacy? To view law as a mechanism for securing obedience by 
instilling fear debases not only law, but also legitimate law makers and loyal subjects. If 
law is to be respectable, civilized, authoritative and legitimate it needs something more 
dignified, less craven than fear of punishment to support it. 
Indeed, in well-ordered societies law is supported by a range of motivations for 
obedience that go beyond mere fear of punishment. Most law abiding people view law as 
a good enough replication of a set of moral norms to which they already feel bound. They 
respect the law as a kind of rough guide to decency and as a necessary condition of life in 
a peaceful community. These connections between law, decency and community mean 
                                                
3 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence
excerpted in Frederick Schauer and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, The Philosophy of Law: Classic and 
Contemporary Readings with Commentary.(Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994) at 33. 
4 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 6-7. 
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that people feel obligated to obey the law even where they have no fear of getting caught. 
Thus authentic respect for law as a motivation for obedience persists even in the absence 
of fear of detection and punishment. 
A reverential respect for law as a guide to morality may retain at least some 
connection to fear – albeit not the sort of material fear conjured up by the “Don’t do X or 
else”. The law abiding person is a person of conscience. Engaging the notion of 
conscience internalizes both the authority of law and the fear-like state it might inspire. 
Indeed, we might ask, if ones conscience isn’t something to be feared, can it be any 
conscience at all?  The conscience issues its own kind of threats. Disregard the dictates of 
conscience and you will be stuck with an inner life which you may find unbearable. You 
will not be able to look at yourself in the mirror. You won’t be able to sleep at night. You 
won’t be able to hold your head high in the community. You fear self-reproach which, 
though perhaps not a visceral fear, may count as a case of fear nonetheless. Conscience 
does not exactly frightened, scare or terrify. The feeling that conscience inspires is more 
in the neighborhood of reverence.  It is perhaps adjacent to guilt and shame. But it is not 
unrelated to fear and may be considered at least its cousin. 
There are also those who are not inclined by conscience to obey the law but who 
may be motivated to do so by pure calculation of self-interest. Such people don’t equate 
the content of the law with morality. Rather they weigh the benefit of breaking the law 
against the severity of the consequence discounted by the probability of getting caught. 
The law sets this purely self-interested person calculating. He reads the law not as “Don’t 
do X, or else Y.” but rather as “If you do X and there’s a Z% chance you will have to pay 
Y.” The possibility of punishment is a cost of doing business to be assessed like any other. 
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If that cost is too high then the self-interested person will comply. If he reckons he will 
come out ahead by disobeying, he will. He doesn’t respect the law in the sense of viewing 
it as authoritative or binding on his conscience. But he also remains in a strategic 
relationship of awareness of the law and attention to it. 
There may be something fear-like even in this purely self-interested motivation 
for obeying the law. What such a person does fear is making a wrong calculation and 
acting against his interests. He fears being a loser. And everything he does is driven by 
the anxiety that he might make a wrong move, a bad calculation, a bum deal. Because he 
is always aware of, and nervous about, the consequences of his actions, the law can 
simply presume and play with his obsessive anxiety to win. This is a kind of competitive 
tension more like anxiety, or compulsiveness than genuine fear. Nevertheless it would 
seem that such a fear-like feeling does play a role in animating the self-interested 
person’s motivation to obey the law.  
But having identified these not-quite-fear-but-fear-like states that can motivate 
obedience to law, we should return now to the core case of fear itself. That is the case 
where we really do hope that the law will function effectively as the command of a 
sovereign backed by a credibly frightening threat. Here we need to consider those 
potential law breakers who have no conscience, who don’t abhor wrong action; those 
who are not good at calculating their own self-interest and have no skill in weighing the 
consequences of their actions. What kind of fear does the law want to inspire in these 
truly unruly types (often also losers) whose aggressive impulses always seem to get the 
better of them? Isn’t it the case that in relation to these people law really does seek to be 
as much like the gunman as possible – motivating the criminal into obedience by 
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shouting: “Hold it right there or I’ll shoot!”? Indeed, we might go so far as to suggest that 
the law would like criminals to fear punishment something like the way that law abiding 
citizens fear crime?
The problem, however, seems to be that criminals – the ones the law really does 
want to scare – for one reason or another seem not to fear punishment. Unlike the person 
of conscience they have no respect for the law.  Unlike the self-interested strategists they 
can never seem to think about the outcome of their actions beforehand. Their fear of 
punishment tends to turn up only after dirty deeds are done. They are distracted by other 
desires, passions, and projects before and during the commission of their crimes. The 
threat of punishment looms large only ex post facto when they have both the time to think 
and the concrete fact of the crime before them. A bloody hand to wash, or a corpse to 
dispose of, sets them thinking about prison, or Siberia, or lethal injection in a way that 
murderous desire doesn’t. They may even, like Dostoyevsky’s Raskolnikov, be obsessed 
by fear of the deed itself, before the doing.  They may questions their own courage and 
capacity to pull off the stick-up, consummate the rape, or inflict the fatal wound. Fear of 
enacting the crime may eclipse fear of the consequences all the way up to the moment of 
commission. 
“Deterrence” is law’s euphemism for striking terror into the hearts of would-be 
criminals. And the question about whether it ever works on those who are not already 
inclined by conscience or calculation to obey is famously debatable. At least part of the 
intractability of the debate stems from the fact that it is impossible to avoid tautology in 
our assessment of the deterrent effects of punishment. It only works on those on whom it 
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obedience can have multiple motives. Therefore, obedience is only ever equivocal 
evidence that fear of punishment has deterred.  Crime, by contrast is always evidence that 
the threat of punishment has failed.
Today we proclaim the impotence of punishment as a deterrent as though this 
were a cutting edge discovery of modern social science. However, the feebleness of 
punishment as deterrent has long been apparent. Nowhere is this position more lucidly 
stated than in Diodotus’ speech in the Mytilenian Debate in Thucydides History of the 
Peloponnesian War. Countering Cleon’s arguments in favor of execution of all the 
Mytilenians as punishment for their revolt against Athens, Diodotus says: “One of 
Cleon’s chief points is that to inflict the death penalty will be useful in the future as a 
means of deterring other cities from revolt; but I, who am just as concerned as he is with 
the future, am just as convinced that this is not so….No one has ever yet committed a 
crime which he thought he could not carry out successfully… So long as poverty forces 
men to be bold, so long as insolence and pride of wealth nourish their ambitions, and in 
the other accidents of life they are continually dominated by some incurable master 
passion or another, so long will their impulses continue to drive them into danger. Then 
too, the idea that fortune will be on one’s side plays as big a part as anything else in 
creating a mood of over-confidence; for sometimes she does come unexpectedly to one’s 
aid, and so she tempts men to run risks for which they are inadequately prepared.”
5
This is a rich passage and it gives us much insight into why those bent on 
disobedience are not swayed by fear of punishment. We will return to Diodotus several 
times again in what follows. But now, to get some help with setting up a conceptual 
                                                
5 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Rex Warner (London: Penguin Books, 1972) 
at 219-220. 
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framework within which to examine some of the reasons why fear of punishment does 
not operate as a pre-emptive reason for action, let us turn to Aristotle’s discussion of fear 
in The Rhetoric. 
Aristotle tells us that “Fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due to a 
mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future… And even these only if 
they appear not remote but so near as to be imminent: we do not fear things that are a 
very long way off.”
6 He later refines this by noting that:  “All terrible things are more 
terrible if they give us no chance of retrieving a blunder either no chance at all, or only 
one that depends on our enemies and not ourselves.” Having set out the things that 
enliven fear Aristotle also considered things that inhibit it. (That is, if we can speak of 
inhibiting fear.) 
One such factor identified by Aristotle was desperation.  Aristotle claimed that 
people do not fear when: “when they feel they have experienced every kind of horror 
already and have grown callous about the future.” Another emotional state which 
Aristotle saw as inimical to fear was anger. Anger for Aristotle was a courageous 
emotion – one that inspired confidence and dispelled fear. 
To get a clearer sense of why the criminals may not fear punishment the way the 
law wishes they would, we shall consider each of these in turn: 1. imagination i.e.  the 
vividness of the criminal’s mental picture of the future evil of punishment, 2. immediacy
i.e. his estimation of how far away in time the evil is and 3. agency i.e. the question of 
how much control he believes he has in preventing the evil. 4. desperation – the 
criminal’s sense of hopelessness about his future and finally 5. anger. 
                                                
6 Aristotle, The Rhetoric, Part II, translated by W. Rhys Roberts online at 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.2.ii.html
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1. Imagination 
First we have imagination. Fear, as they say, is all in your mind. (Though, as any 
coward can attest, it may start in there but it quickly moves down to the throat, the chest, 
the heart, the stomach, the bowls, and the knees.)  The link between fear and imagination 
reveals the potential irrationality of fear. We fear most those things which are most apt to 
inspiring in us vivid pictures, not those things which are objectively the most likely to 
cause harm. 
Consider the difference in our mental pictures of crime and the criminal’s mental 
picture of punishment. We have, of course, no end of texts and images to help us generate 
vivid pictures of crime. First, there is literature. I would venture to suggest that no 
tragedy, Greek, Shakespearian or otherwise, fails to give us a terrifyingly image of 
violent crime. From Medea’s murder of her two sons, (not to mention her murder of 
Glauce by the device of the poisoned fire dress) to Claudius’ poisoning of Hamlet the 
elder, to Orestes murder of his mother Clytemnestra to MacBeth’s murder of Duncan, so 
much of drama is apt to assist us in imagining the horror of violent crime. It is probably 
easier to count the number of novels (even classics) that don’t depict violent crime than 
the ones that do. Movies and TV are another ubiquitous source of mental pictures of 
crime. Likewise, real trials documenting and dissecting crime are an obsession of the 
news media and reports of them give us all kinds of assistance in calling to mind 
frightening pictures. 
What then of mental picture – the imaginative fantasy - involved in fear of 
punishment? How vivid is it? Certainly states used to inflict horrific punishments and 
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make public spectacles of them in hopes of enliven the would-be criminals’ mental 
picture of the future evil punishment had in store. One doesn’t have to get past the first 
few pages of Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish to feel actually violated by the 
gruesome images of the 18
th century punishments he describes.  Tortuous punishments 
have, however, come to be considered crimes in themselves. Thus when photos of the 
atrocities of Abu Ghraib are published the point is not to instill fear of punishment in 
potential prisoners – but rather to instill a sense of outrage at the actions of the torturers 
and to shame the torturers themselves. The state has ostensibly gotten out of the business 
of striking terror into the hearts of would be criminals, spurring their imaginations by 
exhibiting the evil to be feared from punishment.
So where is the criminal to turn for help in conjuring up scary fantasies of 
punishment? Once again, fiction plays a role. TV and the movies help to enliven the 
imagination in formulating mental pictures of the evil of punishment. Crime shows are 
also usually at least partly punishment shows. They show the offenders getting caught, 
being taken down by the police, being humiliated in the interrogation room, being found 
guilty in the courtroom, being taken off to jail, being sexually assaulted by other inmates 
or guards. Sometimes they even show the offender being led to execution and killed. 
For the most part, however, one is protected from imaginative identification with 
these scenes because they are shown from the perspective of the law abiding victim. We 
feel schadenfreude rather than pity in relation to the criminal’s suffering. Though we may 
have a vivid picture of the criminal’s suffering we do not view the picture from their 
perspective. 
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In considering the question of whether the spectacle of one criminal’s punishment 
can inspire a vivid picture and hence fear of punishment in prospective criminals it is 
interesting to consider the relation between fear and pity. In his analysis of the relation 
between pity and fear in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, David Konstan remarks: “…in the case of 
fear there is no reference to merit or desert; criminals fear punishment even if they 
deserve it, whereas pity entails an assessment of whether the other is suffering justly or 
not. Fear, then, does not involve the kind of complex moral judgment that Aristotle 
ascribes to pity and to pity’s contrary, nemesis or indignation.” [131] 
It may be, however, that the barriers to pitying a criminal’s suffering in 
punishment also do double duty as barriers to fear of punishment in the potential criminal. 
If John Braithwaite is right that “most criminals are card carrying retributivists” and 
believe that guilty parties deserve harsh treatment it may be that they do not pity other 
criminals either. And the barriers to pity may also be barriers to fear. Aristotle’s analysis 
suggests that we progress from fear to pity: “what we fear for ourselves excites our pity 
when it happens to others” [part II.] But it may be that the emotional current can also run 
in the other direction. Perhaps we also come to fear those things which we have occasion 
to pity. This is especially true when we have no experience of the evil in question- when 
our mental picture of it comes not from our memory but from our observation of others. 
Imagine, for example that I have no fear of sexual assault. Then one day my 
neighbor is raped. I feel tremendous pity and compassion for her. I am brought close to 
her suffering and feel for her in it. But in the course of identifying with her suffering I am 
also pulled out of my former self-assurance.  It happened to her. So why not me? Thus 
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proximity to suffering may first inspire compassion and that compassion may be a 
stepping stone to fear. 
If a criminal doesn’t pity the suffering other criminals experience through 
punishment, they may not fear it either. Or at least the suffering of other criminals, in the 
absence of pity, will not provide an occasion for the criminal to conceive a vivid picture 
of the suffering of punishment which would in turn inspire fear of it. Pity between and 
among criminals may be necessary to the instructive function the punishment of one 
criminal is supposed to have on others. In other words, if criminals don’t pity each other, 
punishment may be powerless to achieve what we call “general deterrence.” 
As Konstan points out, however, there is the intervening element of desert. 
Aristotle says we pity only when we believe the suffering person innocent. The law 
breaker doesn’t pity the other criminal because he thinks the other one deserves it 
whereas he himself does not. He has a story to tell himself about the extenuating 
circumstances that render his own actions innocent and punishment of him unjust. This 
may be simple hypocrisy, with perhaps a little predisposition to schadenfreude mixed in. 
Punishment, after all, is intended, at least in part, to give pleasure to others at the sight of 
the suffering. And what rogue would deny himself the joy of delighting in another 
rogue’s misfortune? 
But even in schadenfreude there must be empathy. Pleasure in another’s suffering 
depends on awareness of that suffering and real awareness requires empathy. Our 
theories of general deterrence (the idea that the punishment of one criminal will deter 
other potential criminals) presume that empathy alone is enough to engender fear. Simple 
awareness of what the sufferer of punishment is going through – an awareness which 
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doesn’t involve sympathetic concern - should suffice to enliven the putative criminal’s 
imagination about what it would be like to endure the same and that should be sufficient 
to instill fear. 
But is empathy without sympathetic identification enough? Here we need to ask 
whether Aristotle was right that we do not pity those who deserve their suffering. 
Certainly we pity where the extent of the suffering exceeds what is deserved. But we can 
also pity fully deserved suffering. The memory of the offender’s transgression is eclipsed 
by the immediacy of his present plight, making way for compassion. If then the potential 
criminal can see the convict’s fate as pitiable despite his deserving it, perhaps that pity 
would enliven his imagination in a way that would engender the sort of fear that theories 
of general deterrence hope for. 
2. Immanence. 
Again, Aristotle suggests that we do not fear those things which we believe are 
too remote to be worth worrying about. Criminals don’t fear punishment because if they 
see it at all they see it as far off in the future.
Consider Susan Neiman’s discussion in her book Moral Clarity of a scenario 
posed by Kant. Kant imagines a man (think Eliot Spitzer) who, as much as he may want 
to, can’t resist a beautiful prostitute. He knows very well that getting caught would 
destroy his career and maybe his life, and perhaps he even feels hopelessly ashamed of 
his actions. Nevertheless, into the brothel he goes. “But,” writes Neiman, “what if he 
knew he would be hanged immediately upon emerging from its satiating depths – and a 
gallows were installed before the brothel to remind him? Suddenly he discovers that he 
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can stand temptation very nicely, thank you.”[79] Neiman takes from Kant’s example the 
idea that the desire for life trumps all other desires. “For however bright our other desires 
may be – for sex or wealth or any other form or mortal pleasure – all of them pale before 
the desire for life itself. This is almost a matter of logic: without life no consumption.” 
But surely the gallows are overkill (so to speak) in Kant’s example.  Surely it is 
the immediacy and certainly of the consequence, rather than their severity that changes 
the fellow’s mind about whether to go into the house. Wouldn’t the example work 
exactly the same way if we were to install paparazzi (or their eighteenth century 
equivalent) outside the whorehouse instead of the gallows? Ironically, nothing really 
turns on the man losing his life as a result of his actions. In fact he might perhaps prefer
an encounter with the hangman to one with his wife. But, with the consequences looming 
outside the door, he can no longer fear getting caught in a vague far off, distant sort of 
way. Immediate desires win out over remote possibilities lodged safely forward in the 
future. 
“Who knows when?” slides effortlessly into “who knows whether?” In Kant’s 
example it is the immanence of the comeuppance, its future certainty, not just sometime, 
but as soon as the man walks out that door, that raises the fear of the consequence from a 
background anxiety that doesn’t trump desire to an overwhelming reason for action that 
does.  
We have run certainty and immediacy together here in a way that may not be 
justified. Perhaps it is certainty of the punishment that engages fear rather than the 
immediacy of it. But immediacy itself actually secures certainty in a way that makes fear 
the most vivid. Aristotle’s initial discussion of immediacy makes this clear. Death is an 
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event that is certain. But it is the immediacy of death not its certainty that engages fear. 
Aristotle writes: “we do not fear things that are a very long way off: for instance, we all 
know we shall die, but we are not troubled thereby, because death is not close at hand.”  
The distant futurity of the event allows us to call its certainty into question.  And that 
question places a barrier between the event and our fear of it. This buffer against fear is 
even more apparent, not to mention more rational, in relation all those future events less 
certain that death.  The further off any consequence is, the more we rightly project that 
other causes may intervene to prevent that consequence from materializing. But where 
the consequence is undeniably immediate we no longer wager about certainty.  
Immediacy brings an awareness of certainty that is not present when the consequence if 
far off. 
Thus immediacy is the variable that would most enliven fear of punishment. 
However, given our commitment to due process, punishment is never immediate. The 
criminal process with all its lengthy stages and complex constraints intervenes between 
crime and punishment to ensure that the criminal is never faced with an immediate threat 
of punishment prior to the commission of the offence. It is never possible to carry out 
Kant’s thought experiment in real life – we can never erect the gallows outside the 
brothel. The criminal believes, and rightly believes, that punishment is far off in the 
future and that its certainty can be discounted relative to that futurity. 
3. Agency. 
Aristotle says we fear most those things we have no control over. Helplessness 
fosters fear. Conversely, we discount the risk relative to our own self-confidence. 
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Wherever, as Aristotle says, the happening of the future evil seems to depend on us (and 
here perhaps we rely not just on our good judgment but on our good luck) it seems less 
likely to occur. Indeed the very act of paying attention and concentrating on what we are 
doing dispels fear.
The concentration involved in the exercise of skill can take ones mind off fear 
even in the most terrifying circumstances. Sometimes even the smallest exercise of 
agency feels like a powerful guard against harm. As William Ian Miller notes in his book 
The Mystery of Courage, “Zigzagging was the way helicopter pilot Robert Mason would 
take off and land in hot landing zones… The guys teased him about it, telling him he was 
as likely to zig into a round as away from one….But Mason feels that he dodges the 
bullets that missed rather than that they just missed all on their own…The belief in the 
magic of his own agency brings a certain small measure of equanimity.”
7
Similarly, the criminal sees punishment as something he can exercise skill to 
avoid. He discounts the risk of punishment relative to his own confidence. He doesn’t 
think it will happen to him. As Diodotus says: “No one has ever yet committed a crime 
which he thought he could not carry out successfully.” And whether it is his skill or his 
luck that the criminal counts on he believes himself to be the significant variable.  Indeed 
Aristotle’s posits confidence as the opposite of fear and this sense of one’s own particular 
invincibility is precisely what Aristotle is referring to. As a comic conversation between 
the two kidnappers (the sidekick and the leader) in the movie Baby’s Day Out goes: “Do 
you really think we can pull this off?” “Gosh no, actually I just have a morbid curiosity 
about the electric chair.”
8
                                                
7 William Ian Miller, The Mystery of Courage (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) at 218.
8 1994, directed by Patrick Reed Johnson. 
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The criminal fears punishment in the way most of the rest of us fear of accident. 
People consistently report a belief that the risk of traffic accident for them (as drivers) is 
significantly less than the risk for the general population.
9 Viewing ourselves as good 
drivers we believe that by being careful or, better still, skillful, we can avoid becoming “a 
statistic.” We believe that the risk of death, though objectively high for the rest, is not 
nearly as high for us. Likewise the criminal views his own chances of getting caught as 
lower than average. 
Given this, the law might go so far as to wish that the criminal feared punishment, 
not in the vague way that we law abiding sorts fear accident, but rather in the way that we 
fear crime. Consider the following snippet of a conversation I remember vaguely from 
my student days. One student says to the other: “Did you know that on average two 
students a year die in bicycle accidents in the city of Oxford?” The other replies: “Yeah, 
so?” Indignant at this nonchalance the first student says: “Well, what if I were to tell you 
two students a year are knifed to death in their sleep by their scout? You wouldn’t be so 
blasé about that would you? You’d be scared out of your mind. You wouldn’t be able to 
sleep at night. You’d give up your degree. You’d leave town. You’d run for your life. 
How can you be so indifferent to the one risk if the other would paralyze you with fear?” 
The fellow had a point. Change the threat from accidental death to murder and the 
psychology is radically altered. The same objective risk is seen as more frightening at 
least in part because suddenly everything seems to depend on an “enemy’s” agency rather 
than one’s own. And as Aristotle suggests, fear is intensified when we believe that the 
                                                
9 See Francesco Parisi and Vernon L. Smith, The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior (Palo Alto, 
Stanford University Press, 2005). 
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enemy is in control. We can never know when someone is lurking in the shadows. As 
nothing depends on us, we feel vulnerable. Everything turns on someone else’s diabolical 
intention, on someone else’s nefarious skill.  In relation to crime, we are sitting ducks.  
And again, perhaps the law might wish that criminals would fear punishment in 
this way:  that they would see it as depending not on their exercise of skill, or even their 
luck, but on the law that lurks in the dark and is waiting to pounce with all deliberate and 
disastrous intention. 
A person’s confidence in their own skill and agency in avoiding detection and 
punishment may not only allay their fear of punishment, it may actually act as a positive 
pull toward criminal activity. The pride a criminal takes in carrying out an offence and 
eluding the authorities may amount to a powerful sense of creative accomplishment. As 
Jack Katz notes in his book Seduction of Crime, people who commit crimes “may regard 
‘getting away with it’ as a thrilling demonstration of personal competence.”
10  In relation, 
for example, to shoplifting he writes: “By doing something ugly to another, the sneak 
thief or vandal establishes that she can bring beauty into the world. Appreciated from 
within, a sneaky property crime by an amateur is not a failure of social control but a 
personal esthetic triumph….Then she faces a test of whether she can maintain a personal 
‘cool’ and execute the sneaky theft through willful, calculating manipulations. If she can, 
she has proved that she will not ‘freak out’ from the pressures of pulling it off. The 
euphoria that rewards success, then, embodies the awareness that the sneak thief can 
allow herself to be seduced by the world without fear.”
11
                                                
10 Jack Katz, Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil (New York: Basic Books, 
1988) at 9. 
11 Ibid. at 73. 
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Thus the exercise of agency in the commission of crime can be more than just a 
barrier against fear of punishment. Crime can become the site of a perverse realization of 
the Aristotelian virtue of courage. The criminal achieves the Aristotelian mean between 
cowardice and rashness. She is neither cowardly i.e. so fearful of punishment that she 
will not commit the crime at all, nor rash i.e. so excessive in confidence that she “courts 
the intervention of the authorities.”
12 But most importantly, from within the mindset of 
one who takes pride in her criminal agency and skill, fear of punishment can become a 
positive vice of cowardice. 
4. Desperation 
Aristotle tells us that those who “have experienced every kind of horror already 
and have grown callous about the future” do not fear. Law breakers very often fall into 
this category. Diodotus acknowledges this too when he talks about poverty forcing 
people to be bold.  Perhaps even his mention of impulses driving people like the
Mytilenians to danger refers to the role of desperation in dispelling fear of punishment. 
When straights are dire anyway; when death is certain from starvation, Athenian taxation, 
or some other peril – why not risk death by punishment so long as there is something to 
be gained by committing the crime? As William Ian Miller puts it “The assumption is 
that despair means torpor. But add a dash of hope and you get violent and often 
courageous action.”
13 Miller is speaking about soldiers here. But the phenomenon he 
identifies is present in all kinds of situations. Children too can overcome fear when they 
are desperate. Charles Dickens’ David Copperfield, after walking penniless from London 
                                                
12 Ibid. 
13 Supra note 7 at 213. 
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to Dover, now starved, filthy, and exhausted, appeals to his formidable aunt Betsy whom 
he otherwise would have been too frightened ever to approach: “Then, without a scrap of 
courage, but with a great deal of desperation, I went softly in and stood beside her, 
touching her with my finger.”
14 Where the threat of punishment is no more terrifying than 
the risks of inaction, punishment will fail to deter. 
Further, as Aristotle stresses, callousness about the future born of extreme 
circumstances eliminates fear. Perhaps even mental illness or addiction can be seen as 
causes of the kind of despair that inhibits the fear of punishment. Whenever one is utterly 
overwhelmed by ones own afflictions – whatever their nature or genesis - fear of 
punishment will be beside the point. Thus we arrive at a common place of criminology –
that where there is despair there will be crime also. This recognition squarely places the 
burden on the state seeking obedience to its laws to try also to eliminate the conditions 
that give rise to despair. 
5. Anger. 
Certainly anger can dispel fear. Indeed, Aristotle goes so far as to claim that anger 
and fear cannot coexist. He writes: “…you cannot be afraid of a person and also at the 
same time angry with him.” Hundreds of counter-examples spring to mind. Vulnerable 
people treated unjustly almost invariably feel both rage and fear in relation to those more 
powerful people who victimize them. 
                                                
14 Charles Dickens, David Copperfield, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) at187 (Originally 
published 1850.) 
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But in considering the role of anger in dispelling fear of punishment in situations 
of domestic crime we are dealing with a relation that is triangular (the criminal, victim, 
and state) not dyadic as we had in the relation between the Mytilenians and the Athenians 
(the rebels and the state.) The Mytilenians (who were probably both very angry and very 
afraid) lashed out against the Athenians - the very ones who wielded the power to punish.  
But in our domestic crime situations part of the problem is that the third party state has no 
emotional presence in the moment at all. Though the criminal law conceptualizes crime 
as an offence against the state, the psychological reality for both the victim and 
perpetrator is between the two of them.  In a barroom brawl or domestic dispute anger at 
the other person completely distracts the perpetrator from fear of punishment. And it is 
the immediacy of that anger toward the victim that ousts the offender’s capacity to 
connect emotionally to the abstract threat of punishment. Fear of the absent state does not 
kick in when one is consumed by anger at the present victim. 
Aristotle also saw the fear-dispelling properties of anger to be related to the 
connection between anger and justice. An angry person virtually always has some 
perception (however distorted it may be) that he or someone he cares about has suffered 
an injustice. In explaining why the angry are not fearful Aristotle writes: “The fact is that 
anger makes us confident-that anger is excited by our knowledge that we are not the 
wrongers but the wronged, and that the divine power is always supposed to be on the side 
of the wronged.”
15 Thus the angry criminal views himself not as the one to be justly 
punished but as the one doling out just punishment. This righteousness of anger also 
works to inhibit the fear of punishment. Feeling justified in his anger the criminal cannot 
follow the logic of the law that would hold him culpable and thus he has no fear of it.
                                                
15 Aristotle, The Rhetoric, Part II. 
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We see this idea vividly expressed in Jack Katz’s discussion of “righteous slaughter.” 
Katz describes a number of such murderers; from a father who beats his crying baby to 
death, to a husband who kills his wife over an argument about payment of a car loan, to a 
young man who kills a friend for splashing barbecue sauce on him. In each case the killer 
was propelled by the events into an extreme rage and in each case the killer saw himself 
as the defender of “both the morality of the social system and a personal claim of moral 
worth.”
16 They had, as Aristotle notes, a profound confidence that comes from the sense 
that they “are not the wrongers but the wronged” and that as such they were the 
beneficiaries of the divine power.  Katz writes: “In rage, the killer can blind himself to his 
future, forging a momentary sense of eternal unity with the Good.” In such a state of 
righteous indignation it is impossible for the killer to comprehend the logic of a law that 
would hold him to be the wrongdoer not the wronged. In that moment of anger, he cannot 
see that the divine power granted to the injured is on the side of his adversary. 
The Criminal as Victim and the Law as Criminal 
We have seen some of the inhibitors of fear and have looked at how they operate 
in the criminal context in a way that prevents the criminal from fearing punishment. Of 
course, the list here is not exhaustive. Miller notes that Mandeville identified “avarice, 
vanity and ambition” as fear-repressing emotions, to which Miller adds “hatred and 
lust.”
17[226-227.] With so many barriers to fear of punishment, what’s the law to do? 
Perhaps sometimes the law really does want the ability to generate real fear of violation, 
                                                
16 Katz, supra note * at 19. 
17 Supra note 7 at 226-227. 
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to inspire real terror. Once again, perhaps we want criminals to fear punishment, not in 
the vague way that we law-abiding people fear accidents, but in the vivid way that we 
fear crime. We want punishment to seem to potential offenders to depend not on the skill 
of the criminal but on the will of the state. 
How then might law inspire such fear? Should we revive the violent punishments 
that we now see as crimes: public executions, drawing and quartering, tarring and 
feathering? Certainly not. Should we step up our use of the increasingly popular shaming 
punishments which do have in them something of the cruelty of the carnvalesque? No, 
not that either. Or should we frighten them with images not of horrible prison conditions? 
No, such conditions should not exist. Perhaps then we should scare criminals with images 
of the brutality of other inmates - sexual violence and assault? Again no, the law must not 
tolerate, let alone issue indirect threats of, violence inflicted on criminals by others.  
What then is the law to do? 
Let me make only a very modest very partial proposal. In trying to get criminals 
to be genuinely afraid of punishment, my suggestion is that we might scare them with a 
very vivid, very immediate, very intentional, and very creepy and criminal picture 
of...surveillance. 
Perhaps what might be truly frightening is the thought that you are being watched, 
being seen, being heard. Perhaps it is not the punishment itself that is frightening but 
rather the moment of being exposed. Consider for example the wiretap.
18 Like 
Svidrigaïlov listening through the paper-thin wall of Sonia’s room as Raskolnikov
confesses his murders of the two old women, the wiretap doesn’t just catch the criminal;
it reveals him hoisting himself on his own petard.  What if we were to give the criminal a 
                                                
18  See http://www.hbo.com/thewire/
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vivid picture, not of Svidrigaïlov moving his chair towards the door so that he can sit 
comfortably while he listens, but of police, prosecutors, judges, jury members, news 
reporters all sitting comfortably reading, word for word, the naked transcripts of their 
conspiracies? Might we show them in graphic detail the naivety of others like them, 
sitting ducks, criminals more clever than they who have been stalked, who have been 
watched, who have, all the while thinking they were skillfully avoiding detection, been 
the object of casual but intimate observation by their enemies? Nothing inspires pity for 
criminals like reading their unknowing self-incrimination. The poor violated souls don’t 
know that the stinking breath of the police officer is actually on their neck, they don’t 
know that the voyeuristic gaze of the prosecutor is seeing everything. If only they did 
really know that all their private words could with but the stroke of a judge’s pen on a 
warrant be taken from out of their unsuspecting mouths and put down onto the printed 
public page, then they would, perhaps, feel really afraid.  
As a young judicial clerk I remember reading transcripts of wiretaps in drug cases. 
There was something so pathetically and ironically sad about the criminal’s lack of 
awareness. They had no idea that, not only were they being heard perfectly clearly, but 
their words were being coolly transcribed for the eyes of everyone in the justice system. I 
will never forget reading the transcript of a conversation between two co-accused who 
were, in that moment, figuring out that a third man they had been dealing drugs with was 
an undercover cop. The quote read: “And this fucking, fucking, fucking …(times 50 ) 
person.” The sense of humiliation (as William Ian Miller puts it – their being stripped of 
their pretense to status)
19 is so vivid and even funny.  And as much as one is aware of the 
                                                
19 William Ian Miller, Humiliation: And Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort and Violence (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995). 
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guilt of the parties one can’t help but feel the intrusion of the wiretap as a kind of 
violation of them. One can’t help feeling a kind of pity for them.  
HBO’s recent smash hit TV show “The Wire” vividly and sympathetically takes 
the viewer into the perspective of the both the criminals and the law enforcement officers. 
The title of the show is evocative precisely because it encapsulates the wiretap as the way 
into identification with the fear of the criminal. The surveillance camera too creates the 
ultimate “gotcha” evidence eliminating all deniability. There is a moment in the film 
Before the Devil Knows You’re Dead where we see Hank, played by Ethan Hawk, in a 
state of utter panic in a car rental office as he is trying to retrieve incriminating 
evidence.
20 He looks up and sees the surveillance camera looming over him. The sight of 
the camera arrests him psychologically. He is already terrified but it is the sort of fear that 
fuels the violence of desperation. He is perhaps on the verge of committing another crime. 
Yet when his eyes meet camera’s gaze we see in them the recognition that he is cornered 
– that he cannot take any risks now while he is being watched. 
The threat of surveillance can be immediate in a way that the threat of punishment 
never can. Surveillance happens in the present moment. Like the gallows outside the 
whorehouse, the wiretap is right there, right now. 
Moreover, punishment can sometimes be a badge of honor for the hardened 
criminal – a kind of credential in a life of crime. By contrast, being observed by the 
authorities – being watched by the enemy – can never be anything but pure humiliation. It 
may be cool or tough to go to prison but it is always a humiliating failure to be caught in 
the act. There can be a kind of pride in doing time, but there is nothing but shame in 
having been outsmarted. Surveillance undercuts the criminal in a way that punishment 
                                                
20 2007, Directed by Sydney Lumet. 
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itself doesn’t. It establishes the superiority of the law and the fallibility of the criminal in 
a more concrete way than does punishment itself. 
In suggest that making criminals aware of their vulnerability to surveillance might 
make them more fearful of the law, I am not advocating for more use of wiretaps or 
security cameras in law enforcement.  In fact, I am not saying anything about what kind 
of policies a good government should have about wiretapping or surveillance cameras. 
That is a matter for another very different paper. I am only asking us to do the thought 
experiment of considering whether a real understanding of how vulnerable such 
technologies can render even the most skillful and confident criminal might not instill a 
kind of fear which punishment itself can never call up. 
What if we were to show potential offenders all the vivid details of how others 
have been nabbed despite all their skill and luck? Why wouldn’t we want to have 
potential criminals pity the law breaker who is hoist on his own petard and through that 
pity to engender in others the fear that it could happen to them. Perhaps even rage and 
desperation are controllable if one were afraid of being watched. Perhaps even the violent 
spouse might be able to control his fury were he scared that there might be a camera or a 
bug somewhere that would expose his deeds. Of course, we know that in a police state 
where people know they are always being watched and listened to, they are indeed afraid. 
Again, I am certainly not advocating the police state. Surveillance of any kind must be 
used and regulated with great care and attention to privacy interests. Having said that, 
however, we might still agree with Svidrigaïlov ‘s quip to the indignant Raskolnikov: “if 
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you are convinced that one mustn't listen at doors, but one may murder old women at 
one's pleasure, you'd better be off to America and make haste.”
21
                                                
21 Supra note 1 at Part VI, Chapter V. 
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